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ARTICLE
THE FUTURE OF PRACTICE
GUIDELINES: SHOULD THEY
CONSTITUTE CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE OF THE STANDARD OF
CARE?
Jodi M. Findert
I. INTRODUCTION
THE CONSISTENT USE OF WELL-DEVELOPED and
medically appropriate practice guidelines has two potentially
compelling benefits. First, scientifically reliable guidelines can
improve medical practice by reducing the incidence of misdiag-
noses and inappropriate treatment decisions. Particularly when
they delineate national standards of care, guidelines can im-
prove the consistency with which particular procedures are cho-
sen and applied to particular diagnoses. In addition, they can
improve clinical outcomes and promote the efficient use of re-
sources in a health care system dominated by managed care ra-
tioning.
Second, if major inroads are made into the process of cre-
ating and disseminating guidelines, their use may improve the
process of malpractice litigation when the practice of medicine
goes awry or when insurance coverage is denied. Plaintiffs al-
ready rely on guidelines in attempting to prove that a defending
physician, hospital, or other health care provider deviated from
the standard of care. In contrast, defendants seek to introduce
t LL.M., 1999, The George Washington University Law School; J.D., 1998,
The George Washington University Law School; B.A., cum laude, 1995, Duke Uni-
versity. Ms. Finder is currently an associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Green-
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guidelines to demonstrate that their actions or judgments were
consistent with the applicable standard of care.
The legal and medical professions are currently debating
the value of practice guidelines as conclusive evidence of the
standard of care in both individual coverage and professional
liability cases. Nationally accepted guidelines can help stream-
line the judicial process by providing courts and juries with
clear standards against which to measure a provider's behavior
in practicing medicine. However, given the legitimate variation
in what procedures are considered appropriate for certain diag-
noses and the need for physicians to exercise independent medi-
cal judgment in cases where variables preclude simple solu-
tions, guidelines may have only limited utility in the legal proc-
ess. As J. Rosser Matthews proffers:
[E]ven though the introduction of practice guidelines
may promote the policy objective of cost-effectiveness
in the delivery of health care services, their use to es-
tablish culpability in actual cases may be more difficult
because the structure of legal reasoning focuses on the
particular facts in the case at hand rather than appealing
to abstract decision procedures.'
Although the use of guidelines in practice presents a prom-
ising solution for improving care and rationalizing the use of
health care products and services, this does not provide an un-
ambiguous strategy for reducing the number of "bad" decisions
or outcomes.2 Persistent commitment on the part of practitioners
and policy makers towards developing and disseminating
guidelines through rigorous methods is crucial to their future
success.
3
As discussed infra, the Tenth Circuit's surprising deference
to a plan's reliance on its administrator's own guidelines in de-
nying coverage prospectively, thereby essentially making a
medical decision to deny access to coverage, casts doubt on the
J. Rosser Matthews, Practice Guidelines and Tort Reform: The Legal System
Confronts the Technocratic Wish, 24 J. HEALTH POL, PoC'y & L. 275, 275 (1999)
(discussing the potential difficulties of using practice guidelines in the adjudication of
malpractice).
2 See CommIrrEE ON CLiNICAL PRAcncF GUIDELNEs, INSTrrTrE OE MFEDicmE,
GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE: FROM DEVELOPMENT TO UsE 39 (Marilyn J.
Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1992) [hereinafter IOM I].
3 See id.
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possibility that the courts will condition the evidentiary weight
of guidelines on their success in the peer review process and
acceptance by nationally accredited bodies. Due to this seem-
ingly blind approval by one region of the federal judiciary, the
future of guidelines remains uncertain. Their potential to im-
prove both the practice of medicine and the legal process when
that practice fails is tremendous. However, even if a national
body is ordained as the ultimate arbiter of which guidelines are
deemed "gold standards," a physician should neither be deemed
per se negligent simply for departing from a guideline's rec-
ommendations nor be deemed innocent simply for adhering to
them. In light of the fact that issues arise regarding the appro-
priateness of guidelines as the standard of care for one particu-
lar patient, not only is it not desirable for guidelines to be
deemed conclusive, it is not remotely possible in practical
terms.
Although the controversy surrounding the use of guidelines
in insurance coverage decisions is timely and fascinating and
will be addressed, the focus of this Article is the use of guide-
lines as evidence in malpractice litigation. This Article argues
that guidelines have valuable utility in ascertaining the applica-
ble standard of care in malpractice cases, but they should not be
given conclusive weight. Part II defines the array of practice
guidelines, their applications, and their commonalities. Part I][
explains the process of admitting guidelines into evidence to
prove or disprove malpractice. Part IV asserts the continued
need for a judicial process through which the guidelines them-
selves can be challenged. Part V surveys how various courts
have approached the admissibility of guidelines. Part VI ex-
plores judicial and legislative attempts at affording them con-
clusive weight. Part VII evaluates how guidelines could im-
prove the process of malpractice litigation. Finally, part VIII
acknowledges the biases inherent in using them for evidentiary
purposes.
I1. DEFINING PRACTICE GUIDELINES
A legal and policy exploration of practice guidelines re-
quires a basic understanding of their composition, both in form
and substance. This section addresses the range of definitions
and applications.
2000]
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A. Medical Application of Practice Guidelines
Also referred to as "clinical algorithms," "critical path-
ways," "clinical practice protocols," and "practice parameters,"
the term "practice guidelines" encompasses a range of functions
and formats.4 The Institute of Medicine (IOM) defines guide-
lines as "systematically developed statements to assist in prac-
titioner and patient decisions about appropriate health care for
specific clinical circumstances." 5 "[G]uidelines are intended to
assist practitioners and patients in making health care decisions
... [and] to serve as a foundation for instruments to evaluate
practitioner and health system performance."
6
Practice guidelines serve various substantive functions.
They provide guidance on the use of medical devices, criteria
for prescribing pharmaceuticals, and recommendations for
treating specific ailments.7 Regardless of their format, they are
aimed at promoting both higher quality and more cost-effective
health care by making the clinical knowledge generated through
outcomes research available and more easily accessible! Repre-
sentatives of all parties in the health care continuum hope that
use of guidelines will improve the quality of care, as well as
ameliorate the "perceived value obtained for health care spend-
ing. Beyond such widely held aspirations, individual groups dif-
fer in the emphasis they place on other narrower objectives." 9
Regulators, administrators, and purchasers are interested in
controlling cost and decreasing variation in practice patterns.
10
Practitioner groups seek to maintain professional autonomy to
free medical decision-makers from engaging in "external
4 This Article refers to two labels, practice guidelines (or guidelines) and proto-
cols. For purposes of the topics discussed herein, the two terms are used inter-
changeably.
5 Comm=r TO ADVISE THE PuBLIc HEALTH SERVICE ON CLINICAL PRACTICE
GUIDELINES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELNES: DIRECIONS
FOR A NEw PROGRAM, at 8 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990) [herein-
after IOM III.
6 Id. at 2-3.
7 See Deborah W. Garnick et al., Can Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number
and Costs of Malpractice Claims?, 266 JAMA 2856, 2856 (1991) (stating that prac-
tice guidelines are expected to change practice styles, reduce inappropriate and un-
necessary care, and cut costs).
8 See Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health
Care Reform, 5 HEALTh MATRIX 369, 370 (1995) (reviewing the development of
clinical practice guidelines and their impact on the health care reform debate).
9 See IOM I, supra note 2, at 23.
10 See id.
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micromanagement." 11 Advocates of patient rights perceive
guidelines as a means of informing patient decisions, clarifying
their preferences, and improving patient autonomy. 12
In their ideal form, guidelines provide a framework for
medical decision-making. As defined by IOM, they have "one
crucial purpose: to assist individual practitioners and patients in
making decisions about specific clinical problems." 13 They pro-
vide recommendations for managing a patient's care that iden-
tify a management strategy or a range of strategies14 reflecting
informed judgment on how to treat a particular medical condi-
tion.15 Individuals and organizations use guidelines "to structure
organizational procedures, to guide equipment purchases and
hiring decisions, and to set and implement priorities for moni-
toring, feedback, and other efforts to assess and improve per-
formance."
16
Physicians have come to rely significantly on practice
guidelines, tending to prefer them over other resources. One
study asked medical directors to rank the sources of information
used in their decision-making processes. 17 The choices included
medical journals, expert opinions, Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) documents, practice guidelines, Medicare policies,
National Institute of Health (NIH) conferences, and practices of
other plans.18 Whereas less than sixty percent of those surveyed
considered medical journals to be an optimal source of guidance
and forty percent or less considered other sources optimal, use
of practice guidelines was ranked ahead of national expert in-
formation, government documents, and NIH conferences. 19
" Id.
12 Id.
13 d. at 40.
14 See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Practice Parameters and the Malpractice Liability
of Physicians, 263 JAMA 1556 (1990).
15 See Rosoff, supra note 8, at 370.
16 IOM I, supra note 2, at 41.
17 See Claudia A. Steiner et al., The Review Process Used By U.S. Health Care
Plans to Evaluate New Medical Technology for Coverage, 11 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED., at 294 (1996) (concluding that no one source of information was definitive).
18 Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care is Medi-
cally Necessary?, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 229, 231 (1999) (citing Steiner et al., supra
note 17, at 294-302).
19 See id.
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B. The Development of Practice Guidelines
1. Sources of Practice Guidelines Development
For decades, public and private medical associations, as
well as non-medical bodies, have created practice guidelines
through a variety of approaches. They vary substantially in
authorship, form, dissemination, and purpose. Some guidelines
are developed by specialty associations, such as the American
Academy of Pediatrics. Others are developed purely through
actuarial methods, such as those created by Milliman and Rob-
ertson. At another end of the continuum are protocols that have
undergone extensive peer review by practitioners. Societies,
such as the American Academy of Pediatrics, the government
through NIH, and hospitals have been at the forefront of the
guidelines trend. 20 According to General Accounting Office es-
timates, approximately seventy-five organizations have devel-
oped more than 2000 guidelines.2' In fact, so many have been
written that the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research,
along with the American Association of Health Plans (AAHP)
and the American Medical Association (AMA), created a Na-
tional Guideline Clearinghouse (NGC) on the Internet. 22
2. Establishment of the Agency for Health Care Policy and
Research
In November, 1989, Congress amended the Public Health
Service Act to establish the Agency for Health Care Policy and
Research (AHCPR) as an independent agency.23 The legislation
requires that a 'program be instituted "[flor the purpose of pro-
moting the quality, appropriateness, and effectiveness of health
care," and has resulted in the creation of the AHCPR's Forum
for Quality and Effectiveness in Health Care (the Forum).24
20 See BARRY R. FURRow ET AL., HEALTH LAw 365 (1995) (citing origins of
practice guidelines and anticipated benefits and harms).21 See Practice Guidelines: Managed Care Plans Customize Guidelines to Meet
Local Interests GAO-HEHS-96-95, (May 30, 1996), at 3 (discussing the purpose of
clinical practice guidelines and their current use within health plans).
2 See AHCPR, National Guideline Clearinghouse (visited July 14, 2000)
<http'//www.guideline.gov/'mdex.asp>. See also Mark Crane, Clinical Guidelines: A
Malpractice Safety Net?, MED. ECON., Apr. 12, 1999, at 236, 239 (adding that many
of these clinical guidelines contradict one another).
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 299b-l(a) (1994); Pub. L. No. 101-239 (1990).
24 42 U.S.C. § 299b-l(a) (1994).
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More specifically, the AHCPR is charged with the responsibil-
ity of supporting research, gathering data, and other activities:
[T]o arrange for the development and periodic review
and updating of - (1) clinically relevant guidelines that
may be used by physicians, educators, and health care
practitioners to assist in determining how diseases, dis-
orders, and other health conditions can most effectively
and appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated, and
managed clinically; and (2) standards of quality, per-
formance measures, and medical review criteria through
which health care providers and other appropriate enti-
ties may assess or review the provision of health care
and assure the quality of such care.2
Pursuant to a request for advice on how the agency should
approach its responsibility for guidelines, the IOM appointed a
study committee to provide technical help in developing good
guidelines.26 Evaluations have revealed that the AHCPR has
faced a daunting task in improving the quality of medicine na-
tionwide. Given the newness of the program and a pattern of
significant staff turnover, the agency has found itself "in
flux." 27 The magnitude of the responsibility imposed on the
guidelines panel chairpersons was more demanding than ini-
tially envisioned, the literature reviews were more costly in
terms of time and money than expected, and explicit instruc-
tions regarding methodology were lacking. Contracting with
other organizations was part of the agency's response to these
difficulties.28 In 1991, it began to expand its reach by awarding
contracts for the creation of three sets of protocols: (1) to the
American Academy of Pediatrics (with subcontracts to the
American Academy of Family Practice, the American Academy
of Otolaryngology, and the Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh)
for otitis media in children; (2) to the RAND Corporation for
congestive heart failure and post-stroke rehabilitation; and (3)
to the Center for Health Economics Research (with a subcon-
tract to the Harvard School of Public Health) for a literature
analysis and review.29 Although the contracting approach has
2 Id.
2 See IOM H, supra note 5, at 1.
27 See IOM I, supra note 2, at 165.
2' See 42 U.S.C. § 299b-l(c) (1994).
29 See IOM I, supra note 2, at 56.
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left AHCPR out of direct involvement in reviewing the litera-
ture and scientific evidence, the Forum expected to exercise
substantial oversight over the panels, work plans, and literary
reports,30 thereby reducing the risk that the specialty organiza-
tions would lack impartiality in the process.
C. Beyond the Medical Use of-Practice Guidelines
On a purely medical plane, practice guidelines and their
purported utility are straightforward and uncontroversial. How-
ever, medicine is no longer defined in purely curative terms.
The inescapable reality is that the practice of medicine is
largely governed and often hampered by coverage, cost, and
regulatory requirements. Furthermore, interest in practice
guidelines on the part of the multiple players in the American
health care system has increased in light of the dominance of
managed care, which allows plans to maintain control over pro-
viders.31 Because, by definition, managed care organizations
(MCOs) control financial output to providers, they also pro-
foundly influence the medical decision-making process.
Contracts between MCOs, including health maintenance
organizations (HMOs), and physicians generally include clauses
that vest discretion in the MCO to prospectively decide when a
particular treatment or procedure is medically necessary and,
therefore, whether it will be covered.32 Most MCOs and some
physician practice organizations employ practice guidelines to
curb costs in expensive areas, such as asthma management.33
The majority of insurance purchasers are companies that pro-
cure coverage for employees who, in turn, are reluctant to ac-
cept increases in premiums. The employers advocate that the
health care delivery system institute utilization management
systems out of the belief that quality of care will improve as a
result of more consistent practice patterns, thereby yielding
lower costs by reducing coverage of unnecessary and redundant
services.34 These customers are insisting that practitioners be
30 See id.
31 See RAND E. RosENBLATr Er AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 568 (1997).
32 See id.
33 See id.
3 See Marlene Travis & Sue Ellen Bell, Strategies for Managing Medical Risks
in Managed Care Organizations, in GuiDE TO MANAGED CARE STRATEGMS 1999 119,
120 (Joseph Bums et al. eds., 1998) (discussing the possibility of reducing health care
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held increasingly accountable for the level of care delivered to
patients.3
5
In the bureaucratic and contentious environment in which
MCOs have come to operate, denial of care by insurers and poor
outcomes by providers have spurred a culture of aggravated and
adversarial battles - patients are demanding accountability.
Guidelines perhaps stir up the most controversy when used in
the process of litigating coverage and quality of care disputes. It
is interesting that the NGC website noted previously enumerates
a purely medical group of players as its "intended audience,"
including health care providers and provider organizations,
medical specialty and professional societies, researchers, policy
makers, and employee benefits managers. 36 However, it fails to
mention lawyers and judges.37 It also explicitly refuses to make:
[W]arranties concerning the content or clinical efficacy
of the clinical practice guidelines and related materials.
Inclusion of any guideline in the NGC does not consti-
tute or imply an endorsement by the AHCPR or its con-
tractor[s] ... of the guidelines or of the sponsor or de-
veloper of any such guidelines.38
In fact, virtually all guidelines contain disclaimers that the rec-
ommendations contained therein are not intended to be deemed
"the standard of care." 39 It appears that guideline creators inten-
tionally avoid this kind of explicit endorsement due to concerns
over potential liability.
Im. UTILITY OF GUIDELINES IN PROVING AND
DEFENDING MALPRACTICE
Coverage denials are a high-profile source of litigation, and
practice guidelines are implicated in such cases because they
provide the basis for insurance coverage decisions. However,
costs in managed care organizations through adoption of a quality care management
process).
35 see id.
3 See AHCPR, National Guideline Clearinghouse, supra note 22 (identifying
the intended audience of the website).
37 See id.
39 id.
39 Crane, supra note 22, at 240 (noting that virtually all drafters of guidelines
disclaim their recommendations as standards of care).
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the following discussion focuses on their use in the malpractice
context.
A. The Plaintiff's Burden in a Malpractice Action
The significance of the role practice guidelines can, and al-
ready do, play in malpractice litigation becomes apparent when
considered in the context of what an aggrieved party must show
to establish a cause of action. The plaintiff must prove four
elements to establish a prima facie case of negligence: (1) the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to conform his or her con-
duct with a standard of care necessary to avoid an unreasonable
risk of harm to others; (2) the defendant's conduct, by act or
omission, did not comport with the applicable standard of care;
(3) the defendant's failure to satisfy the standard of care was
causally related to the harm suffered by the plaintiff; and (4) the
plaintiff actually suffered harm.40
The second and third prongs are central to malpractice
cases involving practice guidelines, which "speak directly to the
question of the standard of care., 41 More specifically, in a
medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant health care provider deviated from an accepted standard
of care, and that this abrogation caused physical harm to the
plaintiff. At the heart of the debate over the use of practice
guidelines in malpractice litigation is whether guidelines can
provide conclusive evidence of the standard of care against
which the conduct of individual practitioners is measured, or
whether a plaintiff can use them to show the existence of alter-
native courses of treatment that the defending physician should
have taken.
In Washington v. Washington Hospital Center,42 a family
brought a medical malpractice action on behalf of its incapaci-
tated daughter/wife/mother, claiming the hospital negligently
failed to provide the treating anesthesiologists with a capnog-
raph or end-tidal carbon dioxide monitor that would have al-
lowed early detection of insufficient oxygen and, therefore,
would have prevented the brain injury that ensued from an
40 See RESTAT MENT (SECOND) oFToRTS § 328A (1965).
41 Matthews, supra note 1, at 289 (emphasizing that litigation highlights the
conflict between the impersonal objectivity of the guidelines and the physician's
personal expertise).
42 579 A.2d 177 (D.C. 1990) (discussing standards of care applied to hospitals in
tort actions).
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abortion and tubal ligation.43 The plaintiffs expert testified that
the American Association of Anesthesiology Standards for Ba-
sis Intra-Operative Monitoring "encouraged the use of moni-
tors." 44 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that
the evidence presented could have led a reasonable juror to find
that the prevailing standard of care as of the time of the injury
required the hospital to provide the aforementioned monitors;
thus, the trial judge did not err in denying the motion for
judgement as a matter of law.45 Although the Washington Hos-
pital Center court did not explicitly accept the guidelines as
conclusive evidence of the standard of care, this case illustrates
the significant role guidelines play in the outcome of a mal-
practice action.
B. Ascertaining the Standard of Care in a Malpractice Action
1. Sources of the Standard of Care
The standard of care applicable in a medical tort case is not
usually gleaned from external authorities, such as agency stan-
dards.46 Rather, standards are generated through the complex
interaction of leaders, professional journals and conferences,
and professional networks.47 In contrast to other industries that
have relied on governmental agencies to promulgate standards,
neither the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
nor NIH nor state professional licensing boards have played
major roles in the contouring of the practice of medicine.48 In-
stead, over time, hundreds of comments merge to form a clinical
policy; if this becomes generally accepted, then it rises to the
level of "standard practice." 4
9
43 See id. at 180 (explaining the hospital's failure to meet the standard of care by
failing to use a carbon dioxide monitor provided a basis for a medical malpractice
lawsuit).
44 See id. at 82 (discussing foundation for testimony given by the plaintiff's
expert on the use of monitors as a standard of care).
45 See id.
46 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 20, at 362 (explaining standards of care ema-
nating from professional interactions, journal articles, and networking).
See id.
43 See id.
49 See generally David M. Eddy, Clinical Policies and the Quality of Clinical
Practice, 307 NEw ENG. J. MEr). 343 (1982) (discussing the origins and effectiveness
of clinical policies).
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To date, no single authoritative set of practice guidelines
exists. However, many protocols have been published, reflect-
ing policies that have become standard in certain medical com-
munities. The foundation for the debate over the appropriate
application of practice guidelines in malpractice litigation is the
fact that the "standard of care" itself is not a foregone conclu-
sion in the American judicial system. Because human variation
precludes the development of a predetermined standard for
every possible situation, the jury determines the precise level of
care that should be relied upon in adjudicating a particular set of
facts by weighing rivaling evidence.5 0 Each side of the contro-
versy introduces evidence to support its factual and legal theo-
ries in the form of testimony by expert witnesses and the pres-
entation of scientific studies and data.
2. The Reasonably Prudent Physician Standard
It is well-established that the baseline for establishing the
standard of care in any tort case is the "reasonably prudent per-
son standard." If the defendant fails to exercise the degree of
care and prudence necessary to avoid injuring the plaintiff as a
reasonable person in similar circumstances would have, then he
or she is negligent.5'
In cases involving defendants acting as professionals, nar-
rower standards are derived from this gauge. A reasonable pro-
fessional is expected to act in accordance with superior skills or
knowledge that person holds,52 such as medical expertise.
Where physicians are involved, a judge may elevate this stan-
dard to yet a higher level - that of a reasonably prudent medical
specialist. For example, an oncologist may be compared with
other oncologists or an internist compared with other internists
practicing in the same geographic region.53 Although the judge
defines the process of ascertaining standards by ruling what
forms of evidence are permissible, the jury ultimately decides
the specific standard of care that should apply in a particular
case. 
4
50 See Hirshfeld, supra note 14, at 1556 (explaining that a jury would weigh the
practice parameters like any other evidence at trial).
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 See id.
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C. Admission of Scientific Expert testimony
1. The Daubert Standard
The debate over the admissibility of practice guidelines
into evidence is underscored by the shift in judicial policy on
the admissibility of scientific expert testimony in general. Since
1923, Frye v. United States55 had been the leadinp authority on
the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.5 Under Frye,
scientific expert testimony was deemed admissible where the
source from which the proffered principle was deduced had
gained "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific commu-
nity. Many decades later, the United States Supreme Court
overhauled the Frye standard in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc. by holding that the adoption of Federal Rules
of Evidence 58 superseded it. 9
Rule 702 governs the admissibility of testimony by experts,
and provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or edu-
cation, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise. '
Explaining that the drafting history of the Rules fails to mention
Frye and that a "rigid 'general acceptance' standard would
conflict with the "'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their
'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opin-
ion' testimony,"' the Daubert Court rejected the argument that
55 293 F. 1013 (D.C Cir. 1923) (holding that the admissibility of scientific ex-
pert testimony depends upon its "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific com-
munity).
5 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 570, 585 (1993) (char-
acterizing Frye as the "dominant standard" in the 70 years between that case and
Daubert).
57 293 F. 1014 (applying this rule to find that the systolic blood pressure meas-
ure deception test does not have scientific recognition among psychological authori-
ties).5s8 All textual references to "Rule(s)" refer to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
59 See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579-601 (focusing on tests governing admissibility of
scientific evidence).
60 FED. R. EvID. 702.
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the Rules assimilated Frye.61 However, it cautioned that the
Rules do place some limits on the admissibility of "purportedly
scientific evidence." 62 Under Rule 702, "the trial judge must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted
is not only relevant, but reliable.'63 "Expert testimony [that]
does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo,
non-helpful."64
2. Applying the Daubert Factors to Practice Guidelines
In light of the Daubert Court's adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, a trier of fact essentially has two tasks with
respect to the use of practice guidelines in a malpractice action.
First, the court must determine whether the guidelines are ad-
missible as evidence of the standard of care. In ruling on the
admissibility of guidelines, the court must determine: (1)
whether the guidelines are relevant to the conduct in question;
and (2) whether they are reliable sources for delineating sound
or proper medical practice.65 Whether guidelines are deemed
relevant and reliable by courts will ultimately drive the decision
of whether to give them conclusive or merely persuasive weight
in ascertaining the standard of care. Part of this inquiry is con-
sidering whether the standard articulated in the proffered guide-
line has risen to the level of a nationally accepted standard, and
whether a respectable alternative school of thought exists.66
Second, if a guideline is offered as an affirmative defense, the
trier of fact (i.e., judge or jury) must decide whether the defen-
dant followed it appropriately in making treatment or coverage
decisions, prescribing medical products, or rendering medical
care.
It follows that the burdens on the parties seeking to intro-
duce guidelines as yardsticks against which a provider's con-
61 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,
488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988) (citing FED. R. Evw. 701-05)).
62 See id. at 589 (analyzing the Federal Rules of Evidence as they compare to
the Frye test).
63 Id. (emphasis added).
6 Id. at 591 (quoting 3 J. WamsTmN & M. BERGER, WENSTEIN'S EvMENcE
702[02], at 702-18 (1988)).
65 See id. at 589 (discussing a judge's standard of review when deciding to ad-
mit or exclude scientific evidence).
66 See discussions on 'rwo Schools of Thought: Fall-Back Position," infra sec-
tion Im. C.2.b.iv.(B).; The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287
U.S. 662 (1932), infra section IV.B.
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duct are measured will depend on how courts regard guidelines.
Currently, the burden remains on the party desiring to admit the
guidelines to establish both of these attributes, and the opposing
party has the opportunity to refute their applicability. In the fu-
ture, if certain sets of guidelines, such as those approved by na-
tionally recognized and highly regarded medical associations,
are conclusively deemed reliable so that expert testimony is no
longer a prerequisite to their admissibility, then the party seek-
ing to introduce them may only need to enlist experts to vouch
for their relevance to the conduct in question. In other words,
expert testimony will first be employed to establish whether the
particular guideline was appropriately used or should have been
used to guide the physician in screening, diagnosing, or treating
the patient. It will then be utilized to demonstrate whether the
defendant faithfully followed the guideline.
a. Relevance Under Daubert
Rule 401 defines "relevant evidence" as:
[E]vidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.
Relevance depends, in part, on a patient's profile in terms of
age, race, family history, and other medical conditions. Thus, a
particular guideline may be relevant to a patient with the condi-
tion addressed in the guideline, but may be inapplicable to an-
other patient with the same condition who is older and has ad-
ditional medical problems. For example, guidelines for coronary
failure may be irrelevant where a patient also suffers from dia-
betes. Likewise, surgical intervention that would be appropriate
for a middle-aged patient may be too risky for an elderly patient
with the same medical problem. Therefore, as a preliminary
matter, a trial judge must assess whether a guideline can be
properly applied to the facts of the particular case.67 Either both
parties will agree on the relevance of the guideline to estab-
67 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 (discussing the judge's preliminary assess-
ment of the admissibility of scientific evidence).
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lishing the standard of care, or the party seeking to introduce it
will have the burden to prove affirmatively the relevance.
68
Three major factors interact in ascertaining whether a
guideline is relevant to a particular case. First, the primary ob-
jective of the guideline must have been consistent with the phy-
sician's screening, diagnosis, or treatment objectives. 69 Second,
the recommendations contained in the guideline must be appli-
cable to the plaintiff.70 More specifically, the plaintiff must
have been the guideline's intended target. If the plaintiff car-
ries risk factors not contemplated by the guideline drafters, then
the guideline might be deemed irrelevant. Good guidelines al-
low for the variables of an individual patient. Flexibility may be
indicated by traits that require individualized recommendations
or that rationalize departing from the standards.72 For example,
the American College of Physicians, the College of Cardiology,
and the American Heart Association warn against using electro-
cardiograms for screening asymptomatic adults, while acknowl-
edging that this advice might not apply to individuals who
smoke, are male and beyond a certain age, or have hypertension
or diabetes.73 A third indicia of relevance is whether a guideline
accounts for significant new developments in medical research
and technology. Courts should consider two important dates:
(1) the date of publication of the most recent evidence em-
ployed; and (2) the date the final recommendations contained in
68 See Hirshfeld, supra note 14, at 155.
69 See Mark C. Wilson et al., Users' Guides to the Medical Literature: How To
Use Clinical Practice Guidelines: What Are the Recommendations and Will They
Help You in Caring for Your Patients?, 274 JAMA 1630, 1631 (1995) (explaining
the use of practice guidelines).
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id. (citing Harold C. Sox, Jr. et al., The Role of Exercise Testing on
Screening for Coronary Heart Disease, 110 ANNALS INTERNAL MD. 456-69 (1989);
Harold C. Sox, Jr. et al., The Resting Electrocardiogram as a Screening Test: A
Clinical Analysis, 111 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 489 (1989)); American College of
Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on Assessment of Cardiovascu-
lar Procedures, Subcommittee on Exercise Testing, Guidelines for Exercise Testing, 8
J. AM. C. CARDIOL. 725, 729-38 (discussing characteristics that may determine the
appropriateness of using certain tests for screening); American College of Physicians,
Screening for Asymptomatic Coronary Artery Disease: The Resting Electrocardio-
gram, in COMMON SCREENING TESTS, app. at 398 (David M. Eddy ed., 1991); Ameri-
can College of Physicians, Screening for Asymptomatic Coronary Artery Disease:
Exercise Stress Testing, in COMMON SCREENING TESTS, app. at 400-01 (David M.
Eddy ed., 1991).
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the guideline were made.74 Out-of-date guidelines may be ir-
relevant per se in light of new medical developments.
b. Reliability Under Daubert
A party may establish reliability by asking the court to
qualify the guideline under Rule 803(18) - the "learned treatise
exception" to the rule against the admissibility of hearsay - by
enlisting an expert to testify that leading members of the medi-
cal profession consider the guideline to be authoritative. Under
this Rule, the following is exempted from the prohibition
against bringing hearsay into a case:
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness
upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert
witness in direct examination, statements contained in
published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a sub-
ject of history, medicine, or other science or art, estab-
lished as a reliable authority by the testimony or admis-
sion of the witness or by other expert testimony or by
judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
75
The advisory committee's note to this exception explains that,
although the admissibility of learned treatises has generally
been favored, "the great weight of authority" opines that they
should not be independently admissible as substantive evidence
without relying on expert testimony. 76 In other words, "[t]he
Rule avoids the danger of misunderstanding and misapplication
by limiting the use of treatises as substantive evidence to situa-
tions in which an expert is on the stand and available to explain
and assist in the application of the treatise if desired., 77 Eventu-
ally, if guidelines become consistently accepted, then they
might be admitted into evidence by judicial notice,78 a tool that
enables the judge to recognize reliability and enter exhibits sub-
74 See Robert S.A. Hayward et al., Users' Guides to the Medical Literature:
How To Use Clinical Practice Guidelines: Are the Recommendations Valid?, 274
JAMA 570, 573 (1995) (noting that guidelines may be outdated due to the time re-
quired to assemble evidence and achieve a consensus on recommendations).
75 FED. R. EviD. 803(18).
76 Id., advisory committee's note.
77 d.
7s See FED. R. EVID. 201 (stating the applicability of judicial notice to adjudica-
tive factors).
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stantively into evidence without the need for battles of experts
to vouch for their potential value.79 The possibility of using ju-
dicial notice to bring guidelines into the courtroom would re-
quire that they become so well known that reliability would be
presumed. However, given the lack of consensus among medi-
cal associations throughout the nation, judicial notice could
only be used in rare cases where the validity of a guideline is
absolutely incontrovertible.
Declining to articulate a "definitive checklist or test," the
Daubert Court proffered four "general observations" as guid-
ance in determining reliability.80 First, it suggested that a judge
inquire into whether the scientific theory or technique at issue
"can be (and has been) tested."8' A second relevant, but not dis-
positive, factor is whether it has been through "peer review and
publication." 82 However, "[p]ublication . . . is not a sine qua
non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reli-
ability., 8 3 On the contrary, there are valuable theories that may
be too new to be published. 84 Third, a court "should consider
the known or potential rate of error,"85 and the "existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's opera-
tion. ' '86 Finally, "general acceptance" can be a factor in a
court's inquiry into reliability.87 Whereas prevailing acceptance
can be an important factor, a known technique with only mini-
mal support in the scientific community is appropriately
"viewed with skepticism."8 8 The Court then summarized its
suggestions:
The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a
flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific va-
lidity - and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability
- of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.
79 See FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
80 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (discussing the judge's preliminary assessment
of the admissibility of scientific evidence).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. (citing S. JASANOFF, THE FiFrE BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS
PoucYMAKERs 61-76 (1990)).
14 See id.
' See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (citing United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348,
353-54 (7th Cir. 1989).
86 Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978).
7 id.
88 id.
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The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they gener-
ate.
89
Although only proffered in dicta, the Daubert framework
for determining reliability provides a useful tool in weighing
whether a particular guideline should be admitted as evidence of
the standard of care, and also provides a guide for the future of
the judicial use of practice guidelines. These factors may ulti-
mately determine which guidelines should be afforded conclu-
sive weight as substantive evidence.
i. Testable Theories Under Daubert
The first step in establishing reliability of practice guide-
lines is demonstrating that the scientific theory or technique at
issue "can be (and has been) tested."0 Fortunately, modem
medicine allows the medical profession to ascertain, through
outcomes and effectiveness research, precisely which ap-
proaches tend to yield better results. 91Use of today's sophisti-
cated computer technology and the development of more thor-
ough treatment data on a national scale could make this goal
ascertainable.9
2
The Daubert Court explained that "scientific knowledge"
must be based on the scientific method, and announced the re-
quirement that expert testimony relate to scientific knowledge
in order to establish a standard of reliability. 93 The scientific,
evidence-based approach is currently the most widely accepted
method for guideline creation.94 This approach includes struc-
tured and comprehensive reviews of scientific literature, synthe-
sis and evaluation of the literature, and expert panel review.
95
89 Id. at 594-95.
90 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
91 See Rosoff, supra note 8, at 371-72 (discussing the potential benefits of clini-
cal practice guidelines).
92 Dr. David Eddy is a leader in this pursuit. See id. at 372 (citing David M.
Eddy, Clinical Decision Making: From Theory to Practice (pts. 1-4) 263 JAMA 287,
441, 1265 (1990).
93 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90 (discussing standards of admissibility for
expert testimony).
94 See Travis & Bell, supra note 34, at 126 (concluding that the scientific evi-
dence approach is the more widely accepted method for managed care guideline de-
velopment versus consensus-based guideline development).
P See id.
2000]
HEALTH MATRIX
Thus, another indication of reliability is whether, given the
same evidence and methods for guidelines development, a dif-
ferent set of experts yield virtually the same statements.
96
In the mid-1980s, the Institute for Health Care Quality, a
guidelines development company located in Minneapolis, Min-
nesota, initiated a model for evidence-based guidelines, which
has been adopted by the AMA and AHCPR.97 In addition,
Health Risk Management, Inc. developed a set of electronic in-
teractive guidelines, called the "QualityFIRST Medical Risk
Management System," in an effort to improve overall quality of
care and decrease inconsistencies. 98 These guidelines epitomize
the standard for reliability in that they are evidence-based, re-
viewed by internationally acclaimed panels of experts, and up-
dated annually to reflect changes in what is considered "best-
practice." 9
9
ii. Peer Review and Publication Under Daubert
The second reliability factor is whether the guideline has
undergone "peer review and publication." 1°° A judge weighing
this attribute, however, should acknowledge that "[p]ublication
is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily
correlate with reliability."' 10 Peer reviewers may approve or re-
ject certain guidelines based on their own biases rather than on
the objective validity of the guidelines. 10 2 Moreover, certain
types of legitimate guidelines, by definition, may escape exter-
nal peer review. For example, actuarially derived guidelines
may reflect scientifically tested principles, but are not subjected
to the peer review process. In addition, guidelines developed by
professional organizations, such as the AMA, may only be ap-
proved internally.
96 See IOM I, supra note 2, at 30.
97 See Travis, supra note 34, at 126 (citing IOM II, supra note 5, and AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ATrRIBUTES TO GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION
OF PRACICE PARAmETERs/GuiDELINES (1996)).
9 See id. at 127 (discussing specifics of a development by Health Rise Man-
agement, Inc. to improve quality in health care decision-making).
99 See id. at 130 (explaining how guidelines can be applied to improve reliability
and outcomes in managed care organizations).
'0o See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (discussing guidelines for determining the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence).
101 Id. (citing SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FrTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS
POLICYMAKERS 61-76 (1990)).
102 See Hayward, supra note 74, at 574.
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iii. Rate of Error Under Daubert
Third in the reliability injuiry, a court "should consider the
known potential rate of error" and the "existence and mainte-
nance of standards controlling the technique's operation."'1 4 As
a corollary, the credibility of guidelines will depend on the
drafters' candor about the uncertainties regarding the harms or
benefits of the suggested interventions, and whether the recom-
mendations provide flexibility in accommodating those uncer-
tainties inherent to even thoroughly conducted clinical trials.1
5
Medical opinions provide meaningful guidance where scientific
objectivity leaves gaps. Reliable guidelines acknowledge the
use of opinions, as well as the existence of differing views, to
allow room for "legitimate disagreement." 1 6 In such instances,
guidelines may be deemed reliable as a lower threshold for what
a trier of fact should consider proper action by a health care
provider, but may not be afforded conclusive weight. Therefore,
further evidence or expert testimony will be necessary to deter-
mine whether the practitioner exercised the judgement of a rea-
sonably prudent practitioner under similar circumstances to de-
termine the ultimate question of liability.
An attribute of unreliability is presentation of misleading
quantitative standards. Guideline drafters attempting to mask
the existence of uncertainty may enumerate numerical thresh-
olds to provide post-hoc, but artificial, certainty. For example, a
guideline may suggest that "twelve hours" of a particular
symptom is indicative of a medical problem, rather than admit
that "[t]he optimal duration of hemodynamic monitoring is un-
certain." 1°7 To rectify the problems that ensue when medical
providers rely blindly on arbitrary numbers that falsely purport
to be scientifically sound, national or governmental organiza-
tions should create a consistent and quantifiable scale for
weighing the strength and efficacy of scientific data.
'03 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (citing U.S. v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54 (7 th
Cir.1989)).
104 Id. (citing U.S. v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978)).
1o5 See Stephen H. Woolf, Do Clinical Practice Guidelines Define Good Medical
Care?: The Need for Good Science and the Disclosure of Uncertainty When Defining
"Best Practices," 113 CHEST 166S, 168S (1998) (describing how practice guidelines
promote the best care through confidence, but admonishing that these guidelines
should acknowledge the uncertainty of the scientific evidence relied upon).
106 id.
107 Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Furthermore, reliability can be judged according to whether
the drafters have done an adequate job of collecting and synthe-
sizing scientific evidence. 08 To ascertain this, courts can con-
sider whether the guidelines define the evidence used, report
how it was chosen and incorporated, refer explicitly to the cru-
cial data so that a guideline user can review it, and report ran-
domized clinical trials that reveal a causal relationship between
the recommended interventions and healthy outcomes.1°9 Ide-
ally, good guidelines are based on a systematic approach to ap-
praising and classifying the evidence upon which the guideline
developers principally rely.' 10
iv. General Acceptance Under Daubert
Another indication of reliability is whether, given the same
clinical circumstances, practitioners interpret and apply the
same guidelines consistently."' In other words, "general ac-
ceptance" is an important factor in establishing reliability,1
although not dispositive, as it was under Frye. In a time where
the practice of medicine is becoming increasingly globalized,
one way to define general acceptance is through national ac-
ceptance. The accurate diagnosis of a medical condition and the
selection of appropriate treatment responses should not vary
according to geographic region. 113 Instead, medical decisions
"should be based on universally accepted, evidence-based stan-
dards."' 14 Ideally, practice guidelines would invariably reflect
custom. In reality, however, the delivery of health care depends
on the amount of local resources, 1 5 and what is customary
practice constantly evolves in a world where medical technol-
ogy advances exponentially.
log See Hayward et al., supra note 74, at 572 (citing A.D. Oxman et al., Users'
Guide to the Medical Literature: L How to Use an Overview, 272 JAMA 1367
(1994)) (arguing that developers must identify and consider all relevant evidence
when formulating guidelines).
1o9 See id.
110 See id.
111 See IOM I, supra note 2, at 30.
112 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (discussing standards of the admissibility of
scientific evidence).
113 See id.
114 Travis & Bell, supra note 34, at 123 (arguing that accurate diagnosis and
optional treatment should be based on "universally accepted, evidence-based stan-
dards," resulting in similar and efficient health care systems regardless of different
geographic regions).
Ars See id.
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In addition, it is widely acknowledged that clinical practice
varies substantially between geographic regions. A vast body of
evidence, typified by the work of John Wennberg at the Dart-
mouth Medical School and Robert Brook at the University of
California, reveals these inconsistencies 1 6 Variations are found
in which procedures are used to treat a given condition and in
lengths of hospital stays.117 Discrepancies exist even between
geographically proximate communities. 118  In 1973, Dr.
Wennberg discovered that the chance of having a tonsillectomy
by age fifteen was twelve percent in Waterbury, Vermont, but
as high as sixty percent in nearby Stowe, Vermont. 119 According
to subsequent studies, these differences were not attributable to
demographics, such as age, socioeconomics, access to care, or
morbidity. 12° Rather, they were explained by the independent
judgment of treating physicians on the appropriateness of the
surgical procedure. 121 These studies reveal the difficulty of
achieving "general acceptance," insofar as this remains a factor
after the overhaul of the Frye test for admissibility. They also
indicate that reducing the inappropriate use of certain proce-
dures depends on the creation of scientifically sound, evidence-
based guidelines for clinical decision-making.
122
(A) Efforts Aimed at National Acceptance of Guidelines
More specifically, national acceptance is an important indi-
cation of reliability. For example, the AMA launched the Clini-
cal Practice Guideline Recognition Program, a national pilot
project designed to allow physicians to identify which practice
guidelines have been developed in accordance with scientifi-
116 See Rosoff, supra note 8, at 371 (citing John E. Wennberg, Dealing With
Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at
6, and John E. Wennberg et al., Professional Uncertainty and the Problem of Sup-
plier-Induced Demand, 16 Soc. Sci. MEr. 811, 812-17 (1982)) (proposing that clini-
cal procedures and rules vary among different geographic regions by comparing sur-
gical practices and procedures in hospital service areas within particular states).
" See id.
1s See Travis & Bell, supra note 34, at 121 (citing JOHN E. WENNBERG & ALAN
M. GrrrsoHN, SMALL AREA VAm-TONS IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY (reprint Dec.
14, 1973)).
119 See id.
'20 See id.
121 See id.
'22 See id. at 122.
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cally based criteriaZ 3 According to one member of the AMA's
Board of Trustees, Yank D. Coble, not only must guidelines be
scientifically sound, but "physicians must have confidence in
their integrity."'
124
Knowing that a certain guideline's development has met
the AMA's strict standards will give physicians, and
their patients, the assurance they need... the Clinical
Practice Guideline Recognition Program is the AMA's
response to growing concerns among physicians about
misapplication of clinical practice guidelines by some
insurers, the proliferation of proprietary guidelines of
questionable scientific integrity, and the funding of
guidelines by pharmaceutical firms that may preferen-
tially suggest the use of their products.125
The AMA bases its evaluations of the guidelines on criteria
gleaned from "Attributes to Guide the Development and
Evaluation of Practice Parameters/Guidelines," created by the
Practice Parameters Partnership and the Practice Parameters Fo-
rum, groups that include the AMA, the AHCPR, the American
Hospital Association (AHA), and the Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), national
medical specialty societies, and state, county, and metropolitan
physician organizations. 126 Those guidelines that satisfy speci-
fied criteria will be deemed "AMA Recognized Clinical Prac-
tice Guidelines," and the AMA will publish all approved guide-
lines in the "Directory of Clinical Practice Guidelines."1 27
(B) "Two Schools of Thought" Fall-Back Position
Even if guidelines satisfy national standards, the judicial
system cannot ignore the reality that some degree of regional
variation is inevitable. Therefore, it should continue to consider
the "two schools of thought" theory that allows for regional, but
legitimate, variation in standards of care where the alternatives
are also deemed medically legitimate by well-respected mem-
12 See American Medical Ass'n, AMA Launches Clinical Practice Guideline
Recognition Program to Evaluate Guidelines, Press Release, July 16, 1997.
124 Id.
125 id.
126 See id.
'" See id.
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bers of the medical profession. This doctrine allows physicians
to defend their treatment choices in situations where hospitals
or small physician practices have limited resources and cannot
necessarily utilize the most expensive equipment or technology.
For example, a diagnostic guideline that may be applied
feasibly in Manhattan where multiple MRI scanners may be lo-
cated only blocks apart will not be practical in rural Montana'
28
Similarly, whereas the American College of Obstetrics and Gy-
necology recommends mammograms every one to two years for
women aged forty to forty-nine, the American Cancer Society
urges annual mammography. 29 Furthermore, multiple guide-
lines for the same treatment, diagnosis, or procedure may con-
tinue to circulate throughout a specialty community. Even
where national standards come to dominate the practice of
medicine, it is only logical for the judicial process to continue
to allow courts to recognize that deviation from such standards
does not constitute malpractice per se.
v. Other Indicia of Reliability Under Daubert
Promulgation of reliable guidelines requires more outcomes
research. For example, it is important to understand the differ-
ence between what factors lower cholesterol levels and what
effect reducing cholesterol has on healthy outcomes, and how a
cost-effectiveness analysis applies to this clinical scenario.
130
More funding is needed for that kind of research.' 3 ' Typically,
malpractice suits arise out of claims that a patient suffered a bad
outcome that resulted from a flawed process. 132 First, a physi-
cian might have failed to carry out an intervention indicated by
a guideline. 133 Second, a physician might have carried out an
intervention that was not indicated. 134 Third, a physician might
have improperly followed a guideline, e.g., botched a proce-
dure.135 However, guidelines in their current form are of no use
in the last example unless they articulate the predicted outcomes
128 See Crane, supra note 22, at 240 (observing that clinical guidelines will
sometimes vary substantially by location due to the density of medical resources).
'29 See id.
30 Telephone Interview with Brad Moore, M.D., M.P.H. (Mar. 17,1999).
31 See id.
132 See Peter G. Goldschmidt, Can Practice Guidelines Reduce Malpractice
Claims?, 267 JAMA 2602 (1992) (discussing the utility of practice guidelines).
133 See id.
'3 See id.
135 See id. at 2602-03.
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of following them.136 Furthermore, good guidelines will im-
prove the quality of care rendered, thereby preventing bad out-
comes, rather than just helping the few plaintiffs who bring
malpractice suits.
137
Availability of outcomes data is another indication of reli-
ability. Outcomes information can be found in a guideline's
policy statement or supporting article. First, by including infor-
mation about how the options and outcomes contained were
chosen, or by explaining certain data or value choices, hence
demonstrating that the guidelines were created in a systematic
fashion, guidelines can provide physicians or courts with the
tools necessary to make informed evaluations on their utility.
138
More specifically, whether they are intended for screening, di-
agnosis, or treatment purposes, guidelines should specify both
the recommended interventions and sensible alternatives.
139
Guidelines that omit alternatives are likely to lack reliabil-
ity. For example, an American College of Physicians (ACP)
guideline based on a careful review of the literature provides
interventions for preventing strokes. 140 Although the guideline's
preamble suggests carotid endarterectomy as a possible surgical
intervention, the guideline itself fails to mention this highly ef-
fective procedure in the disease management context. 141 Moreo-
ver, a good guideline should not only include management op-
tions, but also the consequences of these options, defined by
morbidity, mortality, quality of life for the patient, patient pref-
erences, as well as economic outcomes for the patient and the
health care system as a whole. 142
'3 See id. at 2603.
137 See id.
138 See Robert S.A. Hayward et al., supra note 74, at 571 (Aug. 16, 1995) (citing
Hayward et al., More Informative Abstracts of Articles Describing Clinical Practice
Guidelines, 188 ANNALS INmRNAL MED. 731 (1993)) (exploring the need to rely
upon only those guidelines that have been tested through systematic methodology).
139 See id.
140 See id. (citing D.B. Matchar et al., Medical Treatment for Stroke Prevention,
121 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 54 (1994)).
141 See id. (citing North American Symptomatic Carotid Endarterectomy Trial
Collaborators, Beneficial Effect of Carotid Endarterectomy in Symptomatic Patients
with High-Grade Carotid Stenosis, 325 NEwENG. J. MED., at 758 (1991)).
142 See id. at 572.
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IV. THE DEGREE OF CONCLUSIVE WEIGHT
AFFORDED TO GUIDELINES REQUIRES
OPPORTUNITIES TO CHALLENGE THE
STANDARD OF CARE
A. Establishing Standards of Care
Before guidelines can significantly improve the evidentiary
process in terms of efficiency and consistency, the standards of
care themselves must be satisfactorily established. Today, too
many court battles are waged on the fundamental issue of what
constitutes customary practice for purposes of establishing the
benchmark standard of care with which a reasonable physician
is expected to comply.
Unless it is determined conclusively that the guidelines de-
veloped in an initiative such as the Maine Medical Liability
Demonstration Project, discussed in Section VI.B., are reliable,
it is unfair to deprive parties of the opportunity to challenge the
guidelines themselves. This only places a "band-aid" on the
problem of lengthy courtroom battles over what guidelines
should be deemed conclusive as the standard of care, without
going through the indispensable process of ascertaining what
guidelines truly are the most appropriate for a particular condi-
tion.
B. Challenging the Standard of Customary Practice
The T.J. Hooper143 sparked the judiciary's recognition that
parties can challenge what is considered customary practice in
an industry. This opinion has provided the basis for the notion
that even a diagnosis or treatment approach established as stan-
dard practice cannot constitute conclusive evidence to establish
a breach of duty. Two barges were lost in a gale because their
tugs were not equipped with radios that would have transmitted
a weather report of a dangerous storm.144 In a widely cited
opinion, the Second Circuit determined that, although the tugs
143 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932) (discussing
liability of a tugboat operator for not conforming to industry practices).
'44 See id. at 738-39.
2000]
HEALTH MATRIX
comported with custom, the custom itself was vulnerable to at-
tack:
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact
common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a
whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption
of new and available devices. It may never set its own
tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in
the end say what is required; there are precautions so
imperative that even their universal disregard will not
excuse their omission .... But here there was no cus-
tom at all as to receiving sets; some had them, some did
not; the most that can be urged is that they had not yet
become general. Certainly in such a case we need not
pause; when some have thought a device necessary, at
least we may say that they were right, and the others too
slack. 141
A more recent case reiterates The T.J. Hooper's mantra. In
United Blood Services v. Quintana,146 Mrs. Quintana received
HIV-infected blood from a transfusion. The defendant blood
bank had comported with the precautionary standards contained
in guidelines that were current at the time and were issued by,
inter alia, the American Red Cross and the FDA.147 Although
the trial court admitted into evidence the standards and testi-
mony regarding the blood bank's compliance with the guide-
lines, it rendered a pretrial ruling that the plaintiffs could not
present expert medical testimony on the allegedly substandard
nature of the screening and testing procedures employed by the
blood banking industry at the time of Mrs. Quintana's transfu-
sion and of their unreasonably deficient ability to prevent the
transmission of AIDS through transfusion.148
In relevant part, the Supreme Court of Colorado granted
certiorari to consider whether the court of appeals erred in de-
termining that the trial court erred in precluding presentation of
evidence that "might tend to show that the customs and prac-
tices in the defendant's industry might not be reasonable and
145 Id. at 740 (internal citations omitted).
146 827 P.2d. 509 (Colo. 1992) (discussing the standard of care applied to blood
banks).
147 See id. at 514-17 (explaining how United Blood Services revised its donor-
screening process in response to recommendations from the Red Cross and the FDA).
'4' See id. at 516-17.
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prudent, and by instructing the jury that defendant's compliance
with these regulations, customs, and practice established, as a
matter of law, the absence of negligence."' 149 In other words, the
blood bank's compliance with guidelines constituted some evi-
dence of due care, but did not serve as conclusive proof that ad-
ditional precautions were unnecessary. In affirming the court of
appeals' decision, the Supreme Court of Colorado relied on The
T.J. Hooper in opining that satisfying the professional standard
of care is not necessarily conclusive proof of due care in a neg-
ligence case. 150 It further explained:
If the standard adopted by a practicing profession were
to be deemed conclusive proof of due care, the profes-
sion itself would be permitted to set the measure of its
own legal liability, even though that measure might be
far below a level of care readily attainable through the
adoption of practices and procedures substantially more
effective in protecting others against harm than the self-
decreed standard of the profession. 1
51
The court opined that the presumption that following the profes-
sional standard of care constitutes due care is rebuttable by the
party challenging the standard itself.152 The jury must decide
whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the stan-
dard is "unreasonably deficient," relying on all evidence per-
taining to the profession's practices and procedures. 153 The
Quintana court ultimately held that the blood bank's conduct
was to be judged by a professional standard of care ascertained
through expert testimony. 154
149 Id. at 518 (citing the lower court opinion in Quintana v. United Blood Serv-
ices, 811 P.2d 424, 431-32 (Colo. App. 1991)).
10o See id. at 520 (noting that satisfying the standard of care set by a profession
does not exclusively prove that the professional has exercised due care).
151 Il
152 See id. at 521.
153 See id.
"5' See id. at 523-24.
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V. HOW COURTS HAVE APPROACHED THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF GUIDELINES
A. Admissibility Through Expert Testimony
Currently, courts that decide to admit guidelines into evi-
dence usually will only allow them to be presented through ex-
pert testimony, but not as independent exhibits. However, some
appellate courts have upheld trial court decisions to admit them
independently, thereby allowing jurors to rely on the guidelines
substantively where they merely reflect ideas about which an
expert would have testified. In Frakes v. Cardiology Consult-
ants, P.C.,155a malpractice case concerning a man who died of
cardiac arrest, the Tennessee Court of Appeals found that the
trial court did not commit error in admitting exercise test pa-
rameters in the form of a printed table and allowing the table to
be present in the jury room during deliberations even though it
was not formally admitted into evidence until after the jury re-
tired. 156 The jury had the task of deciding whether the defendant
doctor deviated from the recognized standard of acceptable pro-
fessional practice, as articulated in a consensus statement on
exercise tread mill tests included in a brochure produced by the
American College of Cardiology and the American Heart Asso-
ciation.1
57
The appellate court deferred to the lower court's judgment
that the parameters were relevant in ascertaining the standard of
care and that they would assist the jury in understanding a diffi-
cult topic. 158 The trial judge had opined that use of the table had
the same effect as if the expert witness stood at a display board
in the courtroom and listed the applicable standards. 59 "By the
end of the trial the exhibit was simply a statement of what at
155 No. 01-A-01-9702-CV--00069, 1997 WL 536949 (Tenn. App. Aug. 29,
1997).
156 See id. at *5 (indicating that "the table was admitted because the court be-
lieved it had been thoroughly explained, that all expert witnesses had conceded that it
was relevant in determining the standard of care, and that it would aid the jury in
understanding a difficult subject").
157 See id. at *2 (adding that the guidelines were entitled "Exercise Test Parame-
ters Associated With Poor Prognosis and/or Increased Severity of [Coronary Artery
Disease]").
151 See id. at *5 (providing that, although the timing of the table's admission was
unfortunate, it was not prejudicial).
159 See id. at *4 (expressing that this was not a circumstance where a jury was
exposed to unexamined hearsay).
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least two experts testified was the standard of care with respect
to reading the test results."'16 Rather than allow it in as market
report or commercial publication excepted from the Tennessee
rule against hearsay, the court relied on the fact that two of the
three experts testified that it reflected the professional standard
of care.e1l Furthermore, all experts questioned conceded that the
table was relevant in identifying the standard of care and as-
sisted the jury in its decision-making process. 62 The key to this
ruling was the determination that the table lacked any independ-
ent value in the absence of expert testimony certifying its rele-
vance. Thus, the trial court did not commit harmful error in ad-
mitting it. 1
63
A concurring judge in Frakes praised practice guidelines as
"systematically developed statements" developed to help physi-
cians and patients make appropriate medical decisions. 64 He
further explained that they can be more than "a mere sampling
of professional opinion" by providing "consensus standards of
conduct that are both clearer and more rational than those cur-
rently used to identify professional negligence."' 165 Although
urging that guidelines "can be extremely helpful" in cases
where a physician allegedly chose the wrong course of action or
neglected to take further action, the concurrence cautioned that
"they should not necessarily be viewed as conclusive evidence
of the standard of care."'166
B. How the Use of Guidelines in Insurance Documents Informs
the Malpractice Debate
Courts have examined the use of practice guidelines in the
insurance context as well. Insurance companies use them to
substantiate benefit denials based on lack of medical necessity.
The defendants in Weaver v. Reagan 167were directors of the
Missouri Department of Social Services and Division of Medi-
cal Services who relied on FDA protocol to defend their deci-
160 id.
161 See id. at *5 (adding that a third expert implied that the table was not wholly
accurate or complete but did embody the consensus standard among cardiologists).
162 See id.
163 Id.
164 See id. at *6 (J. Koch, concurring) (calling for the Court to address the proce-
dure and administration aspects of using such guidelines).
165 id.
166 Id.
167 886 F.2d 194 (8h Cir. 1989).
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sion to limit coverage of AZT to Medicaid patients who met
certain criteria. 168 The court ruled that using the protocol in
medical necessity and utilization control decisions was neither
intended to interfere with the practice of medicine nor to keep
doctors from exercising their best professional judgment.169
This type of coverage case is distinguishable from the
medical malpractice line of cases presented in this Article. In
Weaver, the defendants used guidelines to make treatment deci-
sions, 170 whereas plaintiffs and defendants in malpractice cases
tend to use guidelines as post hoc rationalization for or against
medical decisions. Courts seem to be less likely to disturb a
coverage decision based on legitimate guidelines than to afford
conclusive weight to guidelines in determining malpractice.
Similar to Weaver, in Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos.,171
the Seventh Circuit recognized the necessity of performing
high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow trans-
plants (HDC-ABMT) pursuant to a guideline that set forth the
treatment regimen in detail. 72 The guideline enumerated three
objectives: (1) to establish response rate and duration in breast
cancer treated with HDC-ABMT; (2) to determine toxicity as-
sociated with the treatment regimen in patients with high-risk
primary and advanced breast cancer; and (3) to determine the
length of survival of patients treated with the regimen. 73 The
insurance plan brochure listed three types of reliable evidence
for purposes of establishing the experimental or investigational
nature of a particular treatment: (1) published reports and arti-
cles in the medical and scientific literature deemed authorita-
tive; (2) written protocols employed by the treating facility or
those of another facility studying the same drug, device, treat-
ment, or procedure; and (3) written informed consent utilized by
the treating facility or another facility studying the same drug,
'6 See id. at 198.
169 See id.
170 Id.
171 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993).
172 See id. at 709. The guideline was entitled "Phase II Trial of Standard Induc-
tion Therapy Followed by High-Dose Carboplatin/Cyclophosphamide with Standard
Dose Etopside and Autologous Bone Marrow Rescue for Advanced Breast Cancer."
The protocol was implemented by an oncologist at Indiana University Medical Cen-
ter and his colleagues in 1990, but the University Monitoring Committee had not yet
confirmed its effectiveness. Id.
173 See id.
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device, treatment, or procedure. 74 In affirming the defendant
insurer's denial of coverage for HDC-ABMT for an enrollee
with breast cancer, the appellate court affirmed the district
courts' finding that none of the evidence the plaintiff proffered
to counter the guidelines used by the defense was reliable.
175
Thus, the defendant's denial was not arbitrary and capricious
and the plain language of the insurance contract forced the court
to uphold it. 176
The Tenth Circuit recently went a step further than the Sev-
enth Circuit by refusing to even review the guidelines contained
in plan documents in a case brought under the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In Jones v. Ko-
dak Medical Assistance Plan,177 the Tenth Circuit reviewed the
plan's refusal to pre-certify inpatient alcohol treatment on the
grounds that it was not medically necessary and the program
was located out-of-state. 178 The district court granted the defen-
dant plan's motion for summary judgment, finding that: (1) the
plan administrator's decision was neither arbitrary nor capri-
cious; and (2) the plan did not violate ERISA disclosure re-
quirements by failing to include unpublished criteria prepared
by an administrative services company that administered the
managed care review process under which the appropriateness
of substance abuse treatment was evaluated. 179 The Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court's finding that the unpublished
guidelines were part of the plan's terms and, therefore, that they
were not subject to judicial review.18 It explained that, absent a
showing that the criteria were applied in a discriminatory fash-
ion, ERISA's disclosure provisions do not require that a plan
summary contain "particularized criteria" for assessing medical
necessity in individual circumstances because to do so would
'74 See id. at 708.
175 See id. at 713.
176 See id.
'77 169 F.3d 1287 (10 Cir. 1999) (stating that the beneficiary brought an ERISA
action against a plan administrator, seeking benefits for inpatient alcohol treatment).
178 See id. at 1290 (adding that the plan determines the appropriateness of inpa-
tient treatment on the basis of its criteria).
179 See id.
'o See id. at 1291-92 (explaining that the criteria are unreviewable because it
was a matter of plan construction rather than implementation).
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frustrate the plan summary's purpose - "to offer a layperson
concise information that she can read and digest."18
1
Arguably, this decision suggests a trend away from estab-
lishing a stringent set of judicial standards for affording guide-
lines conclusive weight by raising the bar for a plaintiff to
mount a successful attack on a defendant's use of guidelines.
However, its implications on the defensive use of guidelines in
malpractice litigation remains unclear.
C. Rejecting a "Gold Standard"
As discussed, the success of guidelines as conclusive evi-
dence requires the development of a set of widely acclaimed
guidelines. However, the most authoritative guidelines presently
in existence - those issued by the Center for Disease Control
(CDC) - have not yet fully proven themselves. In Bragdon v.
Abbott, 8 2 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the First Circuit's
holding that a plaintiff who is HIV-positive has a disability
within the meaning of the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA), and that the defendant dentist in the case violated the
ADA by refusing to fill the plaintiff's cavities in his dental of-
fice out of his belief that rendering routine dental care posed a
direct threat to his health and safety. 83 The First Circuit had
found that Ms. Abbott had "adduced competent evidence of rea-
sonable medical judgments by public health officials" by pre-
senting CDC guidelines that specify infection control proce-
dures to be used by dental providers treating HIV-positive pa-
tients.184 It ruled that the guidelines implied that use of these
"universal precautions" allows dentists to render routine care
'8' Id. at 1292 (citing Stahl v. Tony's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 875 F.2d 1404, 1407
(9t' Cir. 1989); Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 680 F.2d 911, 914 (2d
Cir. 1982)).
182 584 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding, inter alia, that HIV is an impairment that sub-
stantially limits the major life activity of reproduction). The Supreme Court re-
manded the case back to the First Circuit, and has denied certiorari on a subsequent
appeal. See Abbot v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87 (1' Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S.Ct.
1805 (1999).
183 See id.
184 See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 945-46 (1' Cir. 1997), affid 118 S. Ct.
2196 (1998) (rejecting Dr. Bragdon's reliance on FDA recommendations that those
who come into contact with a patient's blood refrain from donating blood for one
year).
[Vol. 10:67
THE FUTURE OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES
safely in the private office environment. 185 The court also
deemed persuasive Ms. Abbott's reliance on the 1991 American
Dental Association Policy on HIV.186 Although neither set of
guidelines state explicitly that further risk-reduction measures
are necessary or that treating HIV-positive patients is an inher-
ently safe practice, the court found these conclusions to be im-
plicit in the "detailed delineation of procedures for office treat-
ment."
187
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, found that the First Cir-
cuit mistakenly relied on both sets of guidelines because "[tlhis
evidence is not definitive."18 8 The Court rejected the conclusion
that they "necessarily contain implicit assumptions conclusive
of the point to be decided. The Guidelines set out in the CDC's
recommendation that the universal precautions are the best way
to combat the risk of HIV transmission. They do not assess the
level of risk."'1 9 Although the guidelines were relevant, the
Court did not deem them sufficiently reliable. Thus, it rejected
both the CDC guidelines and the American Dental Association
policy as having conclusive weight. 19° On remand, the First Cir-
cuit reexamined its use of the CDC guidelines and the policy
and, again, decided that it properly relied in them as "competent
evidence that public health authorities" deem the routine dental
treatment to be safe "if undertaken using universal precau-
tions." 191
Although the Supreme Court's rejection of a professional
association's policy is notable, its disapproval of CDC guide-
lines is quite surprising. CDC guidelines have historically been
18 See id. at 946 (affirming the district court's holding on appeal from a grant of
summary judgment, reasoning that routine dental care to HIV-infected patients did
not pose a direct threat to dentists' health, within the exceptions to the Americans
with Disabilities Act).
18 See id.
197 Id. at 947.
'u Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 651 (finding that the CDC and the American Dental
Association's policies do not provide dispositive assessments of IlV transmission
rates).
s9 Id. at 651-52 (adding that the Supreme Court cannot be certain whether the
ADA guidelines on H1V carry the weight of the First Amendment).
190 See id. at 652 (adding that, without more information, the Court is unable to
determine the policy's rate for assessing risks).
191 Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 89 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the "univer-
sal precautions" prescribed by the Center for Disease Control were adequate to allow
a dentist's performance of a cavity-filling on a patient with asymptomatic HIV with-
out imposing a "direct threat" to himself and others).
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hailed as the "gold standard." Therefore, the Supreme Court's
rejection of them places the future of the evidentiary value of
all guidelines in question. Although the First Circuit's refusal to
abrogate its conviction that the CDC guidelines were dispositive
in this case allows room for the growth of guidelines as power-
ful evidentiary tools, the Supreme Court prevented the flood-
gates from opening through its reluctance to allow even nation-
ally acclaimed guidelines to have conclusive weight.
VI. ATTEMPTS AT ELEVATING GUIDELINES TO
THE LEVEL OF CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE
A. The Doctrine of Negligence Per Se
The implementation and enforcement of statutes and regu-
lations also carry implications for the use of practice guidelines
in malpractice litigation. For example, the legal doctrine of
"negligence per se" provides that a defendant who violates a
statute or regulation can be held conclusively negligent, as long
as the legislature or agency intended the statute or regulation to
address the kind of injury the plaintiff suffered.192
It is questionable whether failure to adhere to a protocol
promulgated by a private medical association would ever con-
stitute negligence per se, but it is less questionable whether it
would apply where guidelines are used as quality assurance or
cost containment mechanisms in public programs, such as
Medicare. 193 Because this legal theory depends entirely on the
broad presumption that abrogating any duty imposed by a stat-
ute or regulation would constitute unreasonable behavior in
every case, this application would arguably be too expansive in
the practice guidelines context given the diversity of patients for
which a given guideline would apply. 194
It is probably impossible to draft parameters that could in-
tellectually direct the management strategy for every possible
clinical situation. A statutory directive that parameters always
be followed would not be wise public policy - it could cause
harm by forcing physicians to follow practice parameters when
192 See Hirshfeld, supra note 14, at 606 (opining that the doctrine would probably
not apply in the private context, but could apply in the public context).
194 See id.194 see id.
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it might be better for the patient to follow an alternative
course.
195
For the same reasons, it would also be unreasonable for a
legislature to mandate that courts adopt practice guidelines as
conclusive of the standard of care.196 However, as the defending
plan did in Jones v. Kodak,197 discussed supra section V.B., in-
surers can contract with their enrollees to base coverage deci-
sions on a specified set of guidelines. A plan would either have
to provide specific guidelines in plan documents or incorporate
them by reference. Further, as discussed infra, conflict of inter-
est questions arise when insurers themselves play a role in the
issuance of guidelines that may be based more on cost-saving
considerations than on scientifically sound reasoning.
Statutes could also potentially insulate from liability prac-
titioners who adhere to guidelines. 198 The language contained in
one particular federal statute may come to have this effect, even
though the language does not explicitly include practice guide-
lines. 199 Physicians who treat Medicare patients "in compliance
with or reliance upon professionally developed norms of care
and treatment applied by "a peer review organization are pro-
tected from civil liability."'^' However, in order to enjoy this
protection, the physician must have "exercised due care in all
professional conduct taken or directed by him and reasonably
related to, and resulting from, the actions taken in compliance
with or reliance upon such professionally accepted norms of
care and treatment."' 1 A strong argument can be made that
where a guideline applies to the clinical situation at issue and
the physician follows it with the due care of a reasonably pru-
dent physician in similar circumstances, then the statute could
provide complete protection from malpractice liability.202 This
possibility has not yet been tested judicially. However, if a
court regards a guideline as conclusive in such a case and finds
that the physician departed from it, then the physician would
have no opportunity to challenge the guideline itself.
195 id.
196 See id.
197 169 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999) (adding that ERISA does not require that em-
ployers provide any particular benefits in a plan).
'9 See id.
199 See id.
200 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(c) (1994).
20' 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(c)(2) (1994).
202 See Hirschfeld, supra note 14, at 1562.
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B. State Legislative Initiatives - The Maine Project
In the past decade, some states have begun to experiment
with ways to integrate practice guidelines into cost-containment
efforts and universal access to health care initiatives. In so do-
ing, they have given guidelines the force of the law.
Maine initiated a pilot project in 1991 - the Maine Medical
Liability Demonstration Project (Maine Project) - that legisla-
tively created parameters in four specialties. 203 In addition, in
the early 1990s, President Clinton's health care proposals rec-
ommended procedural reforms for medical malpractice litiga-
tion, specifically adopting programs such as the one in "Maine
that frees doctors from malpractice liability if they can demon-
strate that they followed prescribed clinical practice guide-
lines."2°4 The Maine Project provided an affirmative defense in
malpractice actions for physicians who complied with the
guidelines.20 5 However, plaintiffs were not allowed to use them
to prove negligence if a physician decided not to follow them in
the first place.2°6 Specifically, the legislation provided:
In any claim for professional negligence against a phy-
sician or the employer of a physician ... in which a
violation of a standard of care is alleged, only the physi-
cian or the physician's employer may introduce into
evidence, as an affirmative defense, the existence of the
practice parameters and risk management protocols de-
veloped and adopted pursuant to § 2973 for that medical
specialty area. ... Any physician or physician's em-
ployer who pleads compliance with the practice pa-
rameters . . .as an affirmative defense to a claim for
professional negligence has the burden of proving that
203 See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-78 (West Supp. 1998) (indicating
that the project would run from Jan. 1, 1992 to Dec. 31, 1999).
204 WarmE HOUSE DOMESTIC PoucY CoUNcIL, THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH
SECURITY PLAN § 1 at 91 (1993) (explaining President Clinton's 1993 health care
reform proposals).
2o See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1999).
206 See Crane, supra note 22, at 243 (discussing the Maine Project and its attempt
to use practice parameters as the standards of care).
2 ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2975(1) (West Supp. 1998-99) (emphasis
added).
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the physician's conduct was consistent with those pa-
rameters ....208
The Maine legislature had two health care policy issues in mind
when it developed the Project: (1) increased costs of insurance;
and (2) the practice of "defensive medicine" to shield from li-
ability physicians who comply with the parameters. 2' 9 Essen-
tially, the Project was "an attempt to create legal incentive
structures that make practice guidelines more appealing to phy-
sicians., 2
1°
Three significant obstacles hindered the Maine Project.
First, it was developed without regard to the State's mandatory
pre-litigation screening panel for medical malpractice cases,
which undermined the possibility of avoiding the lengthy pro-
cedures involved in defending a malpractice suit.211 Panels were
to be comprised of a retired judge, an attorney, and a medical
practitioner in the defendant's specialty.212 A unanimous finding
by a panel of negligence was admissible in a subsequent jury
trial, and a plaintiff was allowed to proceed to trial regardless of
a panel's findings.213 Therefore, the legislation did not preclude
the possibility of lengthy litigation. Second, although it imposed
the burden of proof on defendants, it denied plaintiffs the right
to a jury trial and the use of evidence regarding guidelines.214
Finally, the creation of the guidelines applied in the Project
might not have been totally reliable. Advisory committees were
established to develop the guidelines, appointed by the Maine
Board of Registration in Medicine, the Governor, and leaders of
the State Legislature, with the Maine Medical Association and
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. it. 24, § 2975(2) (West Supp. 1998-99).
29 See Jennifer Begel, Maine Physician Practice Guidelines: Implications for
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 47 N.E. L. REV. 69, 78 (1995) (citing Gordon H.
Smith, A Case Study in Progress: Practice Guidelines and the Affirmative Defense in
Maine, 19 JoINT COMM'N J. QUALUTY IMPROvEmENT 356 (1993)).
210 Matthews, supra note 1, at 277 (adding that the dissemination of guidelines
has insufficiently changed practice patterns).
211 See Jennifer Begel, supra note 209, at 71 (1995) (describing obstacles in at-
tempting to use physician practice guidelines in tort reform).
Z1
2 See Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 2852(2) (West 1996 and Supp. 1998) (de-
scribing the formation and procedures of review panels).
213 See Begel, supra note 209, at 74-75 (discussing the lack of impact of findings
by pre-litigation screening panels).
214 See id. at 71 (describing the Project's constitutional obstacles).
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medical specialty societies serving in advisory roles.21 5 How-
ever, it is unclear whether a process effectuated by state organi-
zations would have promulgated guidelines reflecting national
standards.
Eight years after the Project's commencement, not one
plaintiff has initiated a lawsuit against a physician in which
guidelines were a major issue in the case. 216In addition, al-
though plaintiffs' lawyers had threatened to challenge the Proj-
ect's constitutionality, none did.217 Furthermore, analogous pi-
lots in Minnesota, Florida, and Vermont have been repealed or
abandoned. 218 Although proponents of tort reform hoped that
use of the Maine guidelines would lead to a reduction in the
need to present expert testimony in court, this has not yet hap-
pened.2 1 Instead, where guidelines themselves have become a
significant issue in a case, the "battle of expert witnesses" per-
StS220sists.
22
C. The Need for Consistency in Guidelines
As they currently exist, guidelines often depart substan-
tially from generally accepted standards of practice.22 1 Accord-
ing to the General Accounting Office (GAO), one insurance
plan modified the CDC recommendation of chicken pox vac-
cines for all healthy children by suggesting that physicians dis-
cuss the level of immunity offered by the vaccine and then al-
low parents to decide whether they desire the vaccine for their
own children.222 The guideline also opines that it is preferable
that children have chicken pox to assure lifetime immunity
rather than receive the vaccine.22 In considering the potential
impact of this plan's position, note that children can die from
215 See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2972(2)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 1998) (out-
lining the make-up of the medical specialty advisory committees).
216 See Crane, supra note 22, at 243 (noting that the Project expired at the end of
1999).
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 See id. at 236 (commenting that the battle of expert witnesses is more likely to
escalate in litigation where the guidelines are a key issue).
2M id.
221 See ROSENBLATr, supra note 31, at 570.
222 See Practice Guidelines: Managed Care Plans Customize Guidelines to Meet
Local Interests, GAO-HEHS-96-95, May 30, 1996), at 11 (discussing the effects of
local customization of published guidelines).
223 See id.
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chicken pox complications, which is one of the reasons for the
vaccine.
4
Even where guidelines recommend essentially consistent
approaches for a particular medical procedure, they often vary
in level of detail. A comparison of two prostrate cancer-
screening guidelines illustrates this observation. One protocol
enumerates five factors for physicians to consider in deciding
which men are the most appropriate candidates for screening,
including age and family history.2 5 It further lists eight warn-
ings physicians should give to patients prior to testing, includ-
ing the fact that the benefits of screening and aggressive treat-
ment for prostate cancer have not been proven.226 However, an-
other prostrate cancer screening guideline simply states that
routine screening is not necessary for all patients and that those
requesting it should receive objective information about the
benefits and harms.227 Furthermore, whereas one protocol sug-
gests that men aged fifty to sixty-nine will enjoy the most bene-
fit from screening, another encourages it for men aged fifty and
older with a life expectancy of greater than ten years.228
These examples illustrate the reality that guidelines are not
currently consistent enough in level of detail to warrant conclu-
sive evidentiary weight. Some physicians might choose to use
less detailed guidelines that allow more room for subjective
medical judgment. Conversely, those providers who feel more
comfortable relying on recommendations that contain more ex-
plicit detail may violate such guidelines with the same actions
that would probably be permissible under looser guidelines.
VI. THE POTENTIAL FOR GUIDELINES TO
IMPROVE THE PROCESS OF MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION
If reliable practice guidelines become routinely available
and a sufficient number of them are created so that there exist
relevant guidelines for all medical instances, the legal system
could efficiently and consistently base malpractice decisions on
22 See RoSENLA'r, supra note 31, at 570.
225 See National Guidelines Clearinghouse (visited July 14, 2000)
<http://www.guideline.gov> [citations omitted].
22 See id.
m See id.
228 See id.
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them.229 As a result, the number of claims brought would even-
tually decrease because improved quality of care would reduce
the need for suits in the first place.23 0
We know from industrial examples that building quality
into the product is far preferable to postproduction in-
spection to identify products that are meeting standards.
Malpractice claims are the ultimate inspection. They
generate fear, manifested in defensive medicine, and of-
fer few incentives to assure quality. Practice guidelines
offer enormous potential to improve practice, to reduce
avoidable bad outcomes and, possibly, eventually to re-
duce malpractice claims. 231
Furthermore, guidelines should provide enough specificity for
physicians to follow them, but should also allow room for inde-
pendent medical judgment. They should also be created with
scientific objectivity and freedom from conflicts of interest.
A. Specificity of Guidelines and Allowing Room for
Independent Judgment
Contrary to what opponents of the use of practice guide-
lines might believe, those who value them do not define the
goal of relying on them as the elimination of all opportunities
for professional discretion and judgment from the practice of
medicine. 2 Instead, guidelines ideally serve the modest func-
tion of adding structure to the medical decision-making process.
"Knowledge brings limitations, or, at least, the basis of limita-
tions to be imposed. ' ' 233 "[T]he creation of practice guidelines..
. can be seen as part of a significant cultural shift, a move away
from unexamined reliance on professional judgment toward
more structured support and accountability for such judg-
ment." 2
34
29 See id.
230 See Robert H. Brook, Practice Guidelines and Practicing Medicine: Are They
Compatible?, 262 JAMA 3027, 3030 (1989) (discussing the creation, adoption, and
effect of clinical practice guidelines); see also Goldschmidt, supra note 132, at 2062.
231 Goldschmidt, supra note 132, at 2062.
232 See Rosoff, supra note 8, at 375 (discussing the ways in which clinical prac-
ticeguidelines may be used in the managed care setting).
3 Id.
234 IOM 1I, supra note 5, at 2.
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1. Degrees of Specificity
Assuming the incorporation of guidelines into the practice
of medicine becomes more widely accepted, then the amount of
breathing room physicians have in which to apply their own in-
dependent judgment will depend, in part, on the specificity of
the protocols themselves. Thus, the critical question becomes
how specific guidelines should be. The answer to this question
will have a profound impact on the validity and integrity of
guidelines as they are used by both the medical and legal pro-
fessions.
To be medically efficacious, practice guidelines must be
specific enough, as discussed supra, to provide meaningful
guidance upon which physicians can consistently rely. How-
ever, blind reliance on formulaic standards poses the threat of
hampering the use of medical judgment in subjective cases. To
be useful in a legal context, guidelines must be specific enough
to provide clear standards against which to measure a defending
physician's behavior. Although vague standards serve little evi-
dentiary value, inflexible standards may adversely implicate
physicians who appropriately invoked experience and intelli-
gence and who meticulously considered the facts of an individ-
ual patient's case in making difficult clinical decisions.
Attorneys are well aware of this paradox. According to one
defense attorney, "[i]f they are to represent the 'standard of
care,' then any deviation is a problem. If they don't represent
the 'standard of care,' then even if a doctor complies, he could
still be negligent."235 A plaintiff's attorney articulated the other
side of this conflict - "guidelines usually do not contain defini-
tive statements of what is required to constitute appropriate
care, thereby allowing the health care provider to wiggle out of
an apparent violation. 236
2. The Need for Independent Judgment
No single set of guidelines can account for every variable
that affects the diagnosis and treatment of a given patient. First,
guidelines often respond to specific situations only contem-
plated in controlled experimental environments. For example,
23 Andrew L. Hyams et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litiga-
tion: An Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL POL'Y & L. 289, 304-05 (1996)
(discussing how attorneys view the use of guidelines).
2 Id. at 304.
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protocols created to counsel intraoperative monitoring by anes-
thesiologists have been proven to decrease morbidity and mor-
tality, but these guidelines address highly specific aspects of
care in fixed environments. 237 Second, specific conditions sel-
dom occur as isolated ailments. Rather, they often involve mul-
tiple organ system interactions and dysfunctions.238 Further-
more, a treatment that might be effective for a particular condi-
tion that exists in isolation may actually adversely affect other
dysfunctions or disease processes.239 Only a physician's trained
eyes, ears, and mind can reconcile the multitude of factors that
interact in a given clinical situation. Guidelines can merely sup-
plement a physician's judgment and should not attempt to pro-
vide a substitute. A realistic goal for guidelines may be that
they cover eighty percent of the cases.
4
In a Western culture approaching the 2 1st Century, sophis-
ticated technology has enabled the development of medical
equipment and instruments and computer-generated research
data that have made many procedures possible and have im-
proved the consistency and predictability of successful out-
comes. However, the gift of modem technology and research
can not replace, and, in fact, depends upon, independent medi-
cal judgment. Although the ability to challenge guidelines
themselves in light of The H.J. Hooper's legacy addresses this
concern, explored supra, it remains important to allow room for
independent medical judgment. A profession that has raised the
bar for medical school admissions, residency placements, and
board certification must continue to harvest the skills and intel-
lects that its elite members contribute.
"Part of good science is clarifying where evidence ends and
opinion begins." 241 As discussed supra, good guidelines should
specify which of the medical recommendations contained
therein have been proven and which aspects of the screening,
diagnosis, or treatment remain uncertain. Because formal scien-
237 See John D. Ayers, The Use and Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15 J.
LEGAL MED. 421, 427 (1994) (citing Ellison C. Pierce, The Development of Anesthe-
sia Guidelines and Standards, 16 QUALMT REV. BULL. 61 (1990)).
238 See id. at 428 (citing David M. Eddy, The Individual vs. Society: Is There A
Conflict?, 265 JAMA 1446 (1991)).
239 See id. (citing Problems in Managing Coexisting Cardiovascular, Renal Dis-
ease, INTENAL MED. NEWS, June 15, 1991, at 1, 44).
240 Telephone Interview with Brad Moore, supra note 130.
241 Woolf, supra note 105, at 167S (showing that good practice guidelines will
clarify what has been proven by scientific studies).
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tiflc research cannot always suffice to ascertain what is in a pa-
tient's best medical interests, expert opinion and first-hand ex-
perience play valuable roles in flling the crucial gap between
what a guideline covers and what requires independent medical
judgment. 2
Individual variation characterizes clinical practice, and in-
surance clauses about medical necessity demand flexibility that
accounts for a patient's individual needs.2 43 "Given the enor-
mous number of procedures and the individual circumstances of
patients, limiting insurance coverage to a host of separately
validated and specifically described procedures is impracti-
cal."2 Guidelines should be treated as additions to the pool of
data available to the medical profession 'to solve questions of
resource utilization, and as guides for individual practitioners in
the day-to-day decision making process, rather than as the basis
for a per se standard of care in utilization or quality assurance
conflicts.2' 5 It follows that no single practice guideline for a
particular condition can suffice as conclusive evidence.
Some guidelines have acknowledged the importance of re-
lying on independent medical judgment. For example, the actu-
arial firm Milliman & Robertson Co. has prepared a guideline
for ambulatory care, which notes "[t]he guidelines should be
applied to establish a course of treatment for a specific individ-
ual only in conjunction with the application of professional
medical judgment ... ,,"26 If adopted as rigid legal standards,
failure to heed a practice guideline could guarantee defeat for
defending physicians.2 4 7
B. The Impact of Conflicts of Interest on Reliability
Not only must guidelines be derived from objective re-
search, but their reliability depends on freedom from conflicts
of interest.
242 See id. at 167S-68S (citing D.M. Berwick, Harvesting Knowledge From Im-
provement, 275 JAMA 877-78 (1996)).
243 See Rosenbaum, supra note 18, at 230.
244 Id. at231.
25 See Ayres, supra note 237, at 423 (arguing against certain types of guide-
lines).
2 MaIMAN & ROBERTSON, HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES, VOL. 3:
AMBULATORY CARE GumImENEs, 1.1 (1995).
247 See Hirsbfeld, supra note 14, at 1560 (explaining difficulties doctors might
face if plaintiffs use parameters in court).
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The sine qua non of scientific research is the production
of objective results, and objectivity is ensured through a
process of open and vigorous debate among persons
who have no financial stake in the outcome. Yet much
of the decision making about insurance coverage is
based on unpublished, proprietary, and unreviewed data.
Furthermore, methods are undisclosed and unexamined
unless litigation ensues. An endeavor that operates in
this fashion and is subject to the conflict of interest in-
herent in the insurance industry cannot justifiably be
called scientific.24 8
Moreover, studies indicate that practice guidelines often rely on
insurance company decisions rather than on scientific re-
search.249 This presents another reason a guideline must reflect a
carefully conducted and nationally relevant consensus.
Whereas from the 1950s to the 1970s physicians made cov-
erage decisions that went largely unchallenged by insurers, phy-
sician autonomy is a relic of the past.250 In a managed care envi-
ronment, insurers have usurped the power to make coverage
determinations, which inherently allows them to ordain profes-
sional standards of care.251 One bill introduced in the U.S. Sen-
ate would have required that medical necessity standards em-
ployed by insurers reflect "generally accepted principles of pro-
fessional medical practice."2 2 In addition, it would have re-
quired insurers to provide external reviewers to consider, inter
alia, the patient's medical information, the treating physician's
opinion, and that practice guidelines substantiated by govern-
ment-fmanced research and those developed by insurers be de-
clared "free of any conflict of interest." -53 Although the bill did
not become law, similar legislation will likely be introduced in
the next session of Congress. 25 4 In the meantime, the need to
develop objective and conflict-free guidelines is unquestion-
able.
248 Rosenbaum, supra note 18, at 231 (emphasis added).
249 See id. (citing as an example MnuLmAN & ROBERTSON HEALTHCARE
MANAGEMENT GUIDELuNES, 1996-98).
2'0 See id. at 229.
251 See id.
252 Id. (quoting S. 2416 (105"h Cong.) §§ 102(b)(1), (4), 106(b)(3) (1998)).
253 Id.
254 See Rosenbaum, supra note 18, at 229.
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One case decided by a federal court illustrates the problems
insurers face when they rely on internal guidelines both in
making coverage determinations and in litigating subsequent
problems. In Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maryland,
Inc., 255 the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held
that the defendant plan improperly denied coverage of HDC-
ABMT.2 6 The plan's corporate medical director had formulated
plan guidelines that considered the treatment to be experimental
based on a technology evaluation of the treatment conducted by
the Blue Cross National Association. 257 The court ruled that the
medical director acted improperly by failing to base its cover-
age policy for the cancer treatment on a consensus of Maryland
oncologists and the plaintiff's treating physicians, but instead
relied on outside scientific opinion and his own review of the
literature2 58 Although the "tech committee" was probably com-
prised of highly qualified scientists who based the guidelines on
rigorous medical research, the fact that they were employed di-
rectly by the plan raises the question of their impartiality.
VIII. RECOGNIZING BIAS IN THE UTILITY OF
GUIDELINES FOR OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
PURPOSES
Regardless of whether guidelines eventually constitute con-
clusive evidence of the applicable standard of care in malprac-
tice cases, the future of guideline use for litigation purposes
may be asymmetrical.259 The degree to which guidelines should
be regarded as conclusive evidence of the standard of care may
depend on whether courts are skewed in accepting them for in-
culpatory or exculpatory purposes. The controversy surrounding
the Maine Project, discussed supra section VI.B., illustrates the
problems that can arise when legislatures make value judgments
as to whether physicians can escape personal liability when they
follow guidelines, regardless of the independent judgment exer-
cised.
Andrew Hyams conducted a survey of reported cases from
1980 through 1994 to ascertain whether plaintiffs or defendants
255 757 Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1991).
256 d.
257 Id. at 665.
28 Id. at 676.
259 See Rosoff, supra note 8, at 388 (evaluating the use of clinical practice guide-
lines in both offensive and defensive contexts).
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have been more successful in using guidelines.2 ° The study re-
veals that plaintiffs have used them with a substantially higher
degree of success than defendants. 261 The following are exam-
ples of cases evaluated that illustrate how the evidentiary role of
guidelines plays out in both offensive and defensive contexts.
A. Inculpatory Guidelines
In the cases where plaintiffs have used them effectively for
inculpatory purposes, guidelines helped these parties to oppose
summary judgment motions or to prevail on motions for judg-
ment as a matter of law.262 One example is James v. Woolley, in
which the Alabama Supreme Court reversed a summary judg-
ment decision granted in favor of the defendants in a malprac-
tice action brought to recover for the paralysis of a newborn's
arm as a result of delivery.263 The court found persuasive the
deposition testimony of an expert who relied on an American
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) technical bulle-
tin that advised a cesarean section in any situation where a
woman with gestational diabetes gives birth to a baby weighing
over 4000 grams?24 Because the plaintiff, as the non-moving
party, presented evidence form which an inference could be
drawn to support his claim, the appellate court remanded the
case so a jury could weigh the material issues of fact.2 5
In Washington v. Washington Hospital Center,2 6 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals partially relied on the plain-
tiff's proffer of guidelines promulgated by the American Asso-
ciation of Anesthesiology (AAA) in ascertaining the standard of
care in a case brought on behalf of a woman who suffered cata-
strophic brain injury.267 In doing so, the court rejected the de-
fendant's argument that the AAA Standards for Basic Intra-
Operative Monitoring, which "encouraged" the use of carbon
260 See Hyams et al., supra note 235, at 295 (discussing a computerized legal
research study performed by the Authors to assess use and performance of medical
malractice guidelines in the United States).
See id. at 295-96.
262 See id. at 296.
m 523 So. 2d 110, 112-13 (Ala. 1988) (finding an issue of material fact as to the
physician's negligence).
2" See id.
2 See id. at 113.
266 579 A.2d 177 (D.C. App. 1990) (describing a case in which a family sued on
behalf of a patient in a persistent vegetative state).
267 Id. at 182.
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dioxide monitors, were merely "emerging" recommendations
that were not "mandatory. ' 268 According to the court's reason-
ing, "[a] standard of due care ... necessarily embodies what a
reasonably prudent hospital would do... and hence care and
foresight exceeding the minimum required by law or mandatory
professional regulation may be necessary to meet that standard,"
and guidelines and supporting medical journal articles that
deem a standard as emerging can have a "bearing" on an ex-
pert's opinion testimony. 269 This case elucidates the challenges
guideline drafters face when they attempt to couch directions or
recommendations in tentative language intended to prevent
plaintiffs from using guidelines offensively. 270 It also demon-
strates the inherent limitations plaintiffs face when a court can
only accept guidelines as persuasive when presented via expert
testimony, but not as independent exhibits.
B. Exculpatory Guidelines
Guidelines have also inured to the benefit of physicians de-
fending malpractice suits. Levine v. Rosen271 is an example of a
case in which a defendant successfully employed guidelines for
exculpatory purposes. In a case against a physician for failure to
diagnose breast cancer, Mrs. Levine visited her physician to ex-
amine apparent abnormalities on her breast,272 but Dr. Rosen did
not deem it necessary to order any diagnostic tests. However, a
subsequent mammogram revealed adenocarcinoma.273 The de-
fendant submitted into evidence ACOG guidelines recom-
mending "regular" mammography within the treating physi-
cian's discretion to refute American Cancer Society recommen-
dations of annual mammograms for women over the age of
fifty.274 The appellate court remanded the case and suggested
that the trial court instruct the jury clearly on the "two schools
m' See id. (explaining that plaintiff's expert witness partially relied on practice
guidelines in giving testimony on the use of end-tidal carbon dioxide monitors).
2w Id. (emphasis in original).
270 See Hyams et al., supra note 235, at 299 (discussing use of inculpatory
guidelines).
271 616 A.2d 623 (Pa.1992) (holding that clinical guidelines may be used under a
"two schools of thought" doctrine).
272 See id.
273 See id. at 625 (adding that the patient subsequently underwent a right modi-
fied radical mastectomy and chemotherapy).
274 See id. at 625-26.
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of thought" doctrine and explain that it does not shield a doctor
from liability for failure to recognize symptoms.275
Quigley v. Jobe 276 is an example of a case where a court
rejected guidelines in favor of the defendant. The trial court re-
fused to admit risk-management guidelines submitted by the
plaintiff that were generated by an insurance company and rec-
ommended a follow-up exam for breast carcinoma within a
specified period of time.277 The court of appeals ruled that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in reasoning that "the
guidelines were not relevant because they were promulgated by
a private insurance company as part of an insurance contract
and did not reflect a generally recognized standard of care
within the medical profession." 278 Furthermore, the trial court
had excluded the guidelines because the prejudicial effect of
introducing evidence of the defendant's insurance coverage
would have outweighed the probative value of the guidelines.
279
IX. CONCLUSION - WHERE DO WE GO FROM
HERE?
Guidelines should never be deemed dispositive as the ap-
plicable standard of care applied in a malpractice action. Both
the medical and legal professions are far from witnessing the
day when guidelines can be conclusive and where following
them diligently would preclude further inquiry into a physi-
cian's conduct. However, the Tenth Circuit's shocking decision
in Jones v. Kodak to uphold a health plan's benefit denial based
on guidelines by insulating that plan from having to disclose its
guidelines in the first place raises disturbing questions about the
future of guidelines. Perhaps some courts are closer than they
should be in blindly accepting guidelines without examining
their relevance or reliability. "Rather, [other] individual courts
z75 Id. at 628 (noting that upon retrial, the judge should specify on which allega-
tion of negligence there were "two schools of thought").
276 851 P.2d. 236 (Colo. App. 1992) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in deciding that risk management "guidelines were not relevant because
they were promulgated by a private insurance company... land they are not a] rec-
ognized standard of care within the medical profession").
277 Id. at 238 (holding that risk management guidelines contained in a profes-
sional liability policy were not applicable as a relevant standard of care within the
medical profession).
278 Id.
279 See id.
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will continue to balance the rights of individuals against the
needs of society at large in a case-by-case basis .... ,280
Harold C. Sox, outgoing president of the American College
of Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine, opines
that guidelines will increasingly be viewed as the standard of
care and will actually help in defending physicians.2 1 "In a just
and rational world, physicians who follow peer reviewed pro-
fessional guidelines will be held blameless when a patient has
bad luck .... I'm not aware of a situation where a physician
followed such a guideline appropriately and lost the case."' 2 As
guidelines become more widely accepted as the standard of
care, prudent physicians will have no choice but to be aware of
them. "Imagine being on the witness stand and testifying that
you don't know what your specialty society recommends ...[.r283
The reality that guidelines will inevitably be afforded in-
creasing evidentiary weight over the coming years is not objec-
tionable. However, we are far from ready for courts to deem
guidelines conclusive without first establishing a nationally ap-
propriate measure of their validity. Until guidelines become
more standardized and reliable according to objective and na-
tionally recognized standards, due process concerns should pro-
hibit judicial inquiry from ceasing after the question of whether
a defendant obeyed a particular guideline is addressed. Rather,
both parties should be afforded the due process of claiming ad-
herence to or departure from the standards, or of challenging the
standards themselves. Perhaps the puzzle over the definition of
the medical profession epitomizes the debate over the appropri-
ate use of practice guidelines: "Is medicine a science or an
art?"2 4 Accepting the theory that it should be considered both
leads to the inevitable conclusion that guidelines cannot be
deemed conclusive without stripping the medical profession of
its autonomy.
m Matthews, supra note 1, at 299 (implying that guidelines may encourage dia-
logue between technocratic devotees and legal and medical critics).
281 Crane, supra note 22, at 239 (discussing ideas of Harold C. Sox, who believes
physicians will effectively write guidelines to avoid litigation).
282 Id.
283 Id. at 243 (quoting practitioner Gil Solomon, M.D.).
n4 See Matthews, supra note 1, at 275 (noting how ambiguity in self-definition
has historically plagued medical professionals).
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